Leadership is Sinn Fein

Leadership is Sinn Fein’s real weakness(Derry News, 15^th November 2004

As hopes fade of a deal being done in the immediate future between the DUP and Sinn Fein, it is worth reminding ourselves that things have not gone the way of the republican movement in the political process.

Whatever about voting patterns, which can be predicated upon lots of different factors, Sinn Fein has found that there is more to the political way than shouting slogans, killing a few Brits and blowing up the odd factory.

It seems easier to manipulate events when you do it with the coldness of violence than in the slightly warmer face-to-face contact of political involvement. However, there is no doubt that Sinn Fein are finding it difficult to work the political process.

Usurping the SDLP, something they have failed to do in Derry but have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams elsewhere, might not be seen to have been all that desirable if looked upon with the eyes of a responsible politician. For it was the usurping of an idealistic but often pragmatic political party by a less than idealistic, and vastly more pragmatic, but consequently less imaginative, Sinn Fein.

As Anthony McIntyre (The Blanket), Belfast commentator on Provisional Republicanism, records: “…in 1985 [Gerry] Adams suggested that it might not be a good idea for Sinn Fein to overtake the SDLP electorally, as it would result in a dilution of social radicalism…”

It seems that Sinn Fein are aware of the social conservatism that exists within their changing, but changing slowly, political movement that is still dominated by the soldiers.

Nevertheless, there is a perception that things having been getting better for Nationalists because Sinn Fein are at the helm. That is not a reflection of the reality of the situation. Things have not been going Sinn Fein’s way for a number of years.

Anthony McIntyre again records that: “Before the ceasefire kicked in, Martin McGuinness in January 1994 told the Sunday Business Post that the [republican] movement would accept a seven year delay between the conclusion of negotiations and eventual British withdrawal.”

It doesn’t exactly engender confidence in Sinn Fein’s leadership when that was a part of the ceasefire strategy. It demonstrates that they hadn’t much of a clue as to the direction events would go in. The question has to asked, where is the British withdrawal now, supposedly completed three years ago?

Antony McIntyre explains the republican failure in the subsequent negotiations that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement: “[The British] decided to go for the defeat of Provisional republicanism by including republicans but excluding republicanism. For that reason the longstanding Provisional demands were never serious runners for all party talks. And none of them appeared in the Good Friday Agreement.”

While failure has been the hallmark of Sinn Fein in the political process in terms of achieving their major goals, secrecy has been the hallmark of the strategies.

As Ed Moloney states in his book, A Secret History of the IRA, “Adams kept his diplomacy a tightly guarded secret from all of the IRA leadership save those whom he could trust. There was never a chance that Adams could have gone to an Army Council and say, ‘Listen lads, I have an idea; how about we recognise Northern Ireland and agree that we won’t get Irish unity until the Prods say so, we’ll cut a deal with the Unionists to share power, Martin can become a minister – and Barbara – meanwhile you guys will call a permanent ceasefire, give up all those Libyan guns, recognise a new renamed police force and eventually we’ll wind down the IRA and disband it. If we do that, then Sinn Fein, under my leadership of course, will become the new SDLP and Fianna Fails of Ireland.’”

Whilst disagreeing with prediction that Sinn Fein will become a new SDLP, his point is taken: Sinn Fein have made as big a hash of their political involvement as they did of their decision to enjoin the Troubles in a military sense.

And it’s mainly down to populism. Just as their desire to fight a military campaign against the British and unionists was down to a desire to be seen to be popular in the estates of Derry and Belfast, their desire to lead has also been based on the popularity stakes. In effect, they argue that it’s what the people want. But SDLP people never wanted a war, nor would they have asked anyone to fight that war for them, sacrificing their young lives.

It may well then be a question of whom Sinn Fein people look up to. Who are their heroes. Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams?

Anthony McIntyre points to where the problem may lie: “Ultimately the question of whether Gerry Adams is a man of war or a man of peace, is best answered by concluding that that he is a man of neither but is ultimately someone who is prepared to use war or peace in pursuit of enhanced influence and prestige. A man of power is perhaps a more apt description.”

Gerry Adams is central to Sinn Fein’s problems. He is a man who seeks popularity and power, truly contradictory goals for a politician. He is a man who has no strategic morality, seeing violence as having no moral consequences for its participants. He also strikes me as someone who has not got sufficient of the qualities of human warmth and emotional intelligence to be a leader.

Whatever about my views, it’s probably long past the time when Sinn Fein thought about the signals that their present leadership send out. A change of leadership might not be a bad thing, given their disastrous performance to date.

Anthony McIntyre’s article is in The Blanket website.

*John O’Connell is Derry-based author.

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